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VERSE
More Selected Poems on the Law of Contracts:
Raintree County Memorial Library
Occasional Paper No. 2
Edited by Douglass G. Boshkoff*
PREFACE
In 1989, a fortuitous set of events led to the discovery of twenty-
nine poems related to the law of contracts in the Raintree County
Memorial Library. Recognizing their importance, the library trustees
soon authorized publication.' The identity of the author was then,
and is today, a mystery.2 There was no thought that more poems from
the same pen might exist. Recently, however, we have learned other-
wise. The poems included in Occasional Paper #2 were discovered
during a 1995 inventory of duplicate holdings in the Raintree County
Memorial Library.3 The trustees have once again requested that I edit
them for publication.
These new poems supplement those already published in several
ways. Most importantly, among the new discoveries are legible copies
* Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington. Once again, I
have greatly benefitted from the wise advice of Ruth Boshkoff and Bruce Markell.
1 Douglass G. Boshkoff, Selected Poems on the Law of Contracts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1533
(1991).
2 The most interesting hypothesis concerning authorship comes from Professor James W.
Bowers of Louisiana State University. Professor Bowers observes,
[The discovery of these poems] may solve an age old mystery concerning the disappearance
of Sean O'Mahoney, the favorite nephew of Edsel Murphy the famous philosopher. The
family's last word from Sean was a postcard in 1959 from Raintree County. The family has
always surmised that he decided to live his life incognito after the shame of failing out of
Harvard Law School. The work you edited even appears to be a law student's case briefs
and outline of his contracts course.... indeed, probably the outline of a student who would
have flunked it, (particularly if the final exam covered promissory estoppel of bidding sub-
contractors, or the law of assignments.)
Letter from Professor James W. Bowers, Louisiana State University, to Douglass G. Boshkoff,
Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington (Feb. 24, 1992) (on file
with the author). Unfortunately, intensive investigation in the public records of Raintree
County has failed to uncover evidence either supporting or refuting Professor Bowers'
hypothesis.
3 The manuscript for Selected Poems #1 was discovered inside a copy of Life and Law, the
autobiography of Samuel Williston. In what must be regarded as an extraordinary coincidence,
the poems included in the current collection were concealed inside a duplicate copy of the same
book.
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of poems related to Drennan v. Star Paving Co.4 and Taylor v. Cald-
well.5 These texts also appeared in the first manuscript, but in a por-
tion of the document so badly damaged as to be unreadable.
Also prominent are several poems involving well known Cardozo
opinions. Viewing the entire collection of fifty-one works, it is clear
that the author was fascinated by decisions of this famous jurist.
There are four poems in this group and six altogether. No other judge
is represented by more than one. And often, the language in these
poems expresses or implies a very positive view of his work. For ex-
ample, in the Allegheny College case,6 Judge Cardozo possesses "wis-
dom exceeding our ken." In Jacob & Young's, Inc. v. Kent,7 "Cardozo
has shown us the way." And in DeCicco v. Schweizers "Judge Ben
blessed [the] deal." 9
This collection includes second versions of poems based upon
three cases. Two are completely different. The third (Sherwood v.
Walker'0 ) only bears a different final line. Although the recently dis-
covered version is, arguably, a less accurate statement of what oc-
curred in that case, the new concluding language is crisper and
stylistically superior. Presumably, the author returned to this topic
because he was not satisfied with the original effort.
It is fitting that this paper concludes with a tribute to Lon L.
Fuller and William R. Perdue, Jr., authors of one of the most famous
law review articles written in the past 100 years." Quite possibly the
author of these poems attended law school at a time when the Fuller
and Perdue study of reliance damages was receiving more attention
than it does today.12
Occasional Paper No. 1 was very well received.13 It is my hope
that members of the bar, the judiciary, and the academy will find
equal merit in these pages.
Bloomington, Indiana
February 29, 1996
4 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958).
5 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863).
6 Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 159 N.E. 173
(N.Y. 1927).
7 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
8 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917).
9 The one exception is H.R. Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co. (Version 2). See infra Part IV.
10 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887).
11 See infra note 55.
12 I have previously suggested that the unknown author received his law training shortly
after the end of World War II. Boshkoff, supra note 1, at 1533.
13 See Randall T. Shepard, On Lawyers and Writing: Pass the Constitutional Mustard, Please,
28 IND. L. REv. 811, 812-14 (1995).
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I. CONTRACT FORMATION
1. Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co.14
Embry's boss had a very bad plan
When he made the decision to can, 15
Since some words he had said
Became stuck in the head
Of the world's most reasonable man.
2. Petterson v. Pattberg'6
'Tween promisee and promisor
Stood only one discrete front door.
A try to pay
Then went astray,
Thus adding to our contract lore.
3. Davis v. Jacoby17
Which is better: to promise or act? 18
Which more likely will lead to a pact?
With the Whiteheads in need,
Frank chose word over deed.
His reward was a contract in fact.
14 105 S.W. 777 (Ma. Ct. App. 1907). This is one of the leading decisions requiring a jury
instruction based upon the objective theory of contract formation. The court held that a contract
of employment existed if a reasonable man would so interpret the instruction, "Go ahead, you're
all right. Get your men out and don't let that worry you." Id. at 779.
15 To discharge or suspend from a situation. 2 THE OxFoRD ENGUSH DICTIONARY 818 (2d
ed. 1989).
16 161 N.E. 428 (N.Y. 1928) (holding that an offer for unilateral contract may be withdrawn
anytime before performance occurs). This opinion is not well regarded. Farnsworth refers to
this case as "a notorious example" of the general rule. E. ALLAN FARNswORTH, CorNTcrs
§ 3.24 n.11 (2d ed. 1990).
17 34 P.2d 1026 (Cal. 1934) (construing language in offer as requesting promissory accept-
ance, which occurred before offeror died).
18 RESTATEmENT OF Corncrs § 31 (1932) provided a presumption in favor of a promis-
sory acceptance. RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTgcrs § 32 (1981) does not continue the
presumption. Instead, in case of doubt the offeree may accept by either promise or act. The
unilateral-bilateral distinction is less important today than it was when Davis v. Jacoby was de-
cided. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERmLO, CoNRAcrs § 2-26 (3d ed. 1987).
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4. Day v. Caton19
I once knew a plaintiff named Day
Whose attempt to collect went astray.
Though he built a fine wall,
He got nothing at all
'Til a judge said that Caton must pay.
5. Morrison v. Thoelke20
Remember those sellers of land
Whose deal failed to work out as planned.
When they tried to retract,
A court vetoed their act
In accordance with Adams' command.21
6. Elegy for the "Mirror Image" Rule
There once were grand battles of forms
And mirrors22 provided the norms.
Then the Code23 came in view
With a rule that was new
And provoked interpretive storms.24
19 119 Mass. 513 (1876). This case represents a leading decision supporting the proposition
that assent to an agreement to pay may be inferred from silence accompanying the construction
of a wall. The court approved the following instruction:
A promise would not be implied from the fact that the plaintiff, with the defendant's knowl-
edge, built the wall and the defendant used it, but it might be implied from the conduct of
the parties. If the jury find that the plaintiff undertook and completed the building of the
wall with the expectation that the defendant would pay him for it, and the defendant had
reason to know that the plaintiff was so acting with that expectation and allowed him so to
act without objection, then the jury might infer a promise on the part of the defendant to
pay the plaintiff.
Id. at 514. This instruction sounds reasonable. But it is difficult to imagine what facts would
warrant a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. How does Caton learn of Day's expectation? If Day
tells him about it and Caton remains silent, is Day's expectation of compensation reasonable? If
Caton either expressly assents or objects, the acceptance by silence rule is neither necessary nor
applicable.
20 155 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (holding that acceptance may not be revoked
after dispatch if offeror objects).
21 The court expressly adopted the "deposited acceptance rule" of Adams v. Lindsell, 106
Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818). See 155 So. 2d at 904.
22 A reference to the mirror image rule which required that, to be effective, an acceptance
must contain exactly the same terms as the offer. See, e.g., Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender
Co., 110 N.E. 619 (N.Y. 1915), reh'g denied, 111 N.E. 1098 (N.Y. 1916).
23 U.C.C. § 2-207.
24 U.C.C. § 2-207 has not been well received. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND
CASE ANALYSIS IN TiE LAW OF CoN'TRcrs 57 (2d ed. 1993). As white and Summers observe,
"[UCC 2-207] is like an amphibious tank that was originally designed to fight in the swamps, but
was sent to fight in the desert .... It is unfortunate that the drafters did not more adequately
design 2-207 for the terrain upon which it was ultimately to do battle." JAMES J. WHrT &
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-3 (4th ed. 1995).
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II. CONSIDERATION
7. Schnell v. Nell25
A penny, when transferred in jest,
Won't meet the bargained-for test.
When this happened in Schnell
The deal didn't jell.
A result, we all think, for the best.
8. Mills v. Wyman26
The anger of Mills was intense
When Pop failed to pay Son's expense.
"I did what I could,
As everyone should.
The need for a deal27 makes no sense."
9. Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank of
Jamestown28
In the words of a jurist named Ben
(With wisdom exceeding our ken,)
"'Twixt bargain and gift,
There's nary a rift
At least when I'm wielding the pen."
25 17 Ind. 29 (1861) (finding that the payment of one cent was not adequate consideration).
"The consideration of one cent is, plainly, in this case, merely nominal, and intended to be so."
Id. at 32.
26 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (1825) (finding a father's promise to pay for services previously
rendered to his son not supported by consideration). In many casebooks, Mills is paired with
Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935) (finding a moral obligation to be sufficient
consideration to support a subsequent promise to pay), to show contrasting views on whether a
moral obligation is sufficient consideration. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER & MELVIN A. EISENBERG,
BAsic CoNrTAcr LAW 177-83 (5th ed. 1990).
27 "A deliberate promise, in writing, made freely and without any mistake ... cannot be
broken without a violation of moral duty. But if there was nothing paid or promised for it, the
law, perhaps wisely, leaves the execution of it to the conscience of him who makes it." 20 Mass.
(3 Pick.) at 211 (emphasis added).
28 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927). This is one of Cardozo's most notable private law decisions in
which he found consideration in a charity's implied promise "to perpetuate the name of the
founder of the memorial." Id. at 176.
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10. Drennan v. Star Paving Co. 29
When reliance caused bidders to brawl.
Section 90 was R. Traynor's call.3 0
And the wisdom of Hand,3 1
So oft in command
For once didn't matter at all.
11. DeCicco v. Schweizer3 2
The Count, while performing his duty,
Had an eye on additional booty.
When Judge Ben blessed his deal,
The Count's pleasure was real.
"Adesso, pago io, i tutti.133
III. MUTUAL MISTAKE AND IMPOSSIBILITY
12. Sherwood v. Walker (Version 2).34
We've all heard the story of Rose
Whose failure to bear was a pose.
"For the stew pot, I'm not,"
Said Rose, like a shot.
And she wasn't, as everyone knows.
29 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) (holding that unbargained-for reliance of prime contractor pre-
vented revocation of subcontractor's bid).
30 Id. at 759 (indicating that Traynor was relying on § 90 of the Restatement of Contracts).
31 A reference to Judge Learned Hand's famous opinion in James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros.,
Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933). Hand had concluded that "There is no room in such a situation
for the doctrine of 'promissory estoppel."' Id. at 346. Traynor's opinion cites, but does not
discuss, James Baird. 333 P.2d at 760. Ultimately, Traynor's view prevailed. See FARNswoRTH,
supra note 16, § 3.25.
32 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917). This opinion has been characterized by Farnsworth as a "judi-
cial tour de force." Cardozo's opinion finds consideration in a promise to induce both con-
tracting parties not to rescind their contract. See FARNswoRTH, supra note 16, § 4.22 n.22.
33 "Now, I can pay all my debts."
34 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887) (finding that a mutual mistake as to a cow's fertility provided a
basis for avoiding the contract). The original last line was "And the court held the deal couldn't
close." Boshkoff, supra note 1, at 1539. An erasure of text at this point in the recently discov-
ered manuscript suggests that the author was not satisfied with the original concluding line.
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13. Taylor v. Caldwell (Version 2).35
Implied conditions36 were the rage
To shift the risks of war and age.
Restatement Two 37
Has terms quite new
To cope with Caldwell's blazing stage.
IV. Tim RIGirrs OF TmRD PARTIES
14. Seaver v. Ransom38
Beman, J. failed to honor his word
To his wife for the good of a third.
When the court made him pay,
The old judge had his say.
"But for Fox, this would not have occurred. '39
15. H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. (Version 1)40
There once was a plaintiff named Moch
Whose building was turned into smoke.
Though the damage was real,
The court nixed his appeal
So that Rensselaer wouldn't go broke.41
35 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863) (excusing performance when music hall destroyed by fire).
36 "[The contract is] subject to an implied condition that the parties shall be excused in case,
before breach, performance becomes impossible from the perishing of the thing without default
of the contractor." Id. at 312.
37 The Restatement (Second) substitutes risk analysis for doctrines based upon implied
terms. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRAC, Introductory Note to Chapter 11 (1981).
38 120 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1918) (leading decision recognizing the enforcement rights of a third
party donee beneficiary).
39 In reaching its conclusion, the Seaver court relied on several prior New York decisions
including Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859). Perhaps Judge Beman was correct in attributing
his loss to that famous case. It is, however, hard not to believe that American law, with or
without Lawrence, would eventually have conferred enforcement rights on contract benefi-
ciaries. Seaver was decided in 1918, the same year that Arthur Corbin began his fifty year cam-
paign for full recognition of third party beneficiary rights. See Anthony J. Waters, The Property
in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HA.v. L. REv. 1109, 1148-72
(1985).
40 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928) (stating that the owner of building destroyed by fire may not
maintain action as third party beneficiary of contract between city and water company).
41 In a broad sense it is true that every city contract, not improvident or wasteful, is for the
benefit of the public. More than this, however, must be shown to give a right of action to a
member of the public not formally a party .... The field of obligation would be expanded
beyond reasonable limits if less than this were to be demanded as a condition of liability.
Id. at 897.
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16. H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. (Version 2)
Water, water never there42
To quench the dreadful flare.
Some embers pop,
Still not a drop.
And Cardozo doesn't care!43
V. ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION
17. Hochster v. De la Tour 4
A breach before performance day
Just can't exist, so sages say.45
But, nonetheless,
Queen's Bench says yes
And De la Tour is made to pay.
VI. REMEDIES
18. Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey46
Remember the promise by Jack
Where reliance in front and in back
Of the date of the deal
Seemed not equally real.
So, the court barely sanctioned 47 Jack's lack.48
42 These opening words echo the beginning of Coleridge's famous poem, "The Rime of the
Ancient Mariner."
43 This criticism of Cardozo is a bit unfair. The judge, as pointed out in Version 1, supra, was
obviously concerned about the extensive liability that a contrary result would impose on the
defendant. On the other hand, Moch is not one of Cardozo's most celebrated decisions. For an
analysis of Moch in light of his other opinions, see RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDozo: A STUDY
IN REPUTATION 109-10, 113-15 (1990).
44 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q.B. 1853) (stating that an action is not premature when promisor
repudiates before date set for performance and promisee immediately commences an action to
recover damages).
45 There have been many critics of the rule that the disappointed promisee has an immediate
action for damages. The arguments on both sides are reviewed in FARNswoRTH, supra note 16,
§ 8.20.
46 265 Il1. App. 542 (1932) (denying recovery for precontract reliance expenses).
47 The appellate court remanded the case for a new trial. Its opinion specifically denied
recovery of any damages for lost profits (estimated at $1,600,000) as too speculative. It also
denied recovery of expenditures occurring before the contract was signed. The potentially re-
coverable postcontractual reliance damages were, in comparison, rather minimal. Id. at 552-54.
48 A defect; failing; a moral delinquency. 8 THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 571 (2d ed.
1989).
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19. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co.49
The penalty paid was too great
In view of Lake River's fate.
Though he questioned the laws
Which avoided the clause50
Posner, J. soon set everything straight.
20. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz51
Oh so tasty, those carrots of Wentz,
With a flavor both bold and intense!
Well, the terms of their sale
Went beyond any pale,
Thus providing the perfect defense.
21. Lumley v. Wagner52
Indirection is Equity's thing53
If a diva refuses to sing.
By restraint of an act
It enforces her pact
To produce a Wagnerian ring.5 4
(continued)
49 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that Illinois law requires invalidation of liquidated
damage clause when amount payable is not a reasonable estimate of probable damage).
50 "[Tlhe refusal to enforce penalty clauses is (at best) paternalistic - and it seems odd that
courts should display parental solicitude for large corporations." Id. at 1289.
51 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948) (denying specific performance to sell carrots when contract
language favoring buyer amounted to "carrying a good joke too far").
52 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852) (restraining opera singer from performing for competitor
during term of her contract with plaintiff).
53 In Lumley, the Lord Chancellor denied that he was indirectly enforcing the contract.
"[T]he injunction may also, as I have said, tend to the fulfillment of her engagement; though, in
continuing the injunction, I disclaim doing indirectly, what I cannot do directly." ld. at 693.
54 A ringing tone or quality in the voice. 13 THm OxFoRD ENGUSH DICTIONARY 955 (2d ed.
1989).
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22. An Ode to Lon Fuller and William Perdue55
Reliance once earned no respect
As an interest the law would protect.
Then Lon and his friend
Brought this time to an end
With an essay of sweeping effect.56
55 Lon L. Fuller and William R. Perdue, Jr. were the authors of The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages (pts. 1-2), 46 YALE LJ. 52, 373 (1936-37), widely regarded as one of the most
notable law review articles of the twentieth century.
56 The original manuscript containing these poems is on file in the archives of the Raintree
County Memorial Library. It is not, however, available for inspection. As Ross Lockridge once
wrote:
Hard roads and wide will run through Raintree County. You will hunt it on the map,
and it won't be there.
For Raintree County is not the country of perishable fact. It is the country of enduring
fiction. The clock in the Court House Tower... is always fixed at nine o' clock, and it is
summer and the days are long.
Ross LOCKRIDGE, RAIN REE COUNTY, title page overleaf (1948).
